



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE**  
**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995**

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

November 29, 2001

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young  
CRYPTOME  
251 West 89<sup>th</sup> Street  
Suite 6E  
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your requests.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. The records are enclosed for your use.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to Soviet Activities in Mexico, ZF010343W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and four pages are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 3.4(b)(1) and 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. Fees for processing this request are waived. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.

Since the release of the information deleted from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

In addition, information has been sanitized from the records and two pages of the same pages withheld under (b)(1) are also denied in their entirety as the release of the information would reveal the identity of confidential sources and sensitive intelligence methods. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) and (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources and sensitive investigative methodologies.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that information has been sanitized from the records and 71 pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA F-1998-00869 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have also been informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that information has been sanitized and four pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the FBI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530-0001 within 60 days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal". Please cite FBI/PA #435213-1 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Coordination has also been completed and we have been informed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized and 32 pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ATTN: SVI-1-FOIA, Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA #0346-98 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.


During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

We are coordinating with other government agencies concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer case #851F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Russell A. Nichols". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'R'.

Russell A. Nichols  
Chief, Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF 010343W

As of 26 Sept 79 all material included  
(Date)  
in this file conforms with DA policies currently  
in effect.

Jacqueline Lewis 26 Sept 79  
(Signature) (Date Signed)

Suzanne M. Lewis CSS  
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA

JP AR 381-10

REVIEWER... [Signature]

DATE 27 Oct 79

REVIEWED BY ARCHIST  
DATE 8 FEB 1989

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA

JP AR 381-10

REVIEWER... [Signature]

DATE [Signature]

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Sino Soviet Base  
Intell det. in Mexico*

SEP 1 1961

ACSI-SC

**SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Mexico Based Operations (U)**

121947a

**THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
United States Continental Army Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia**

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Fourth United States Army  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas**

**Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Sixth United States Army  
Presidio of San Francisco, California**

1. (U) Reference ACSI-SC letter, dated 10 May 1961, subject: "Aggressive Counterintelligence (U)."

2. (U) In view of the staff size of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, plus official Cuban representation and their activities, this office must assume that the Cuban Intelligence Services are an integral part of Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence efforts in Mexico.

3. (U) Recent reports indicate increasing Cuban potential for both the conduct and/or support of intelligence operations emanating from Mexico. This potential is predicated upon the following:

a. The presence of known Soviet intelligence operatives in Cuba, presumed to be functioning as advisors.

002

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON MAR 4 1996  
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO  
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

342C Sharp

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULES

RECORDS SECTION COP

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Coulson  
W...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Mexico Based Operations (U)

b. Mexico has long been a trans-shipment point for Cuban propaganda. The recipients have all had a long history of Communist affiliations and sympathies, if not actually maintaining Communist Party membership. Such experienced militants constitute a potential intelligence operations support group.

c. Agencia Informativa Latinoamericana, S.A., (Prensa Latina - Cuban wire service) offices exist throughout Mexico, affording ideal agent cover.

d. Pro-Castro groups and front groups are widespread throughout a revolutionary-sympathetic Mexico, providing a generous source for agent recruitments.

e. The Cuban refugee flow to Mexico provides cover and a means of transportation for possible illegals.

f. Fishing boats from the Northeast coastal villages of the Yucatan Peninsula allegedly rendezvous with Cuban fishing vessels on the high seas for the purpose of transporting Cuban refugees. The Isla Mujeres which lies off the Yucatan at the point nearest Cuba has frequent small craft visitations. In the last 10 months, it has been alleged that at least 26 vessels have set forth at night to meet Cuban boats engaged in arms smuggling.

g. The Cuban Foreign Ministry intends to establish a Consulate in every state in Mexico. The most recently established is the Cuban Consulate in Merida. (There has been no consulate in Merida since late fall 1959.)

h. It has been reported that U.S. visas are counterfeited in Cuba, for the years preceding 1958. Apparently, the alleged forger has a seal for the year 1957, and cannot document any passport that was not issued by the Cuban Ministry of State since the name was changed in 1958 to the Ministry of Exterior. A passport issued by the Batista government could successfully establish Cuban Intelligence Service agents as anti-Castro refugees.

003

2

DECLASSIFIED  
ON 1/28/88  
BY 7900  
CDR USAINSCOM FOIPG  
EPA 3-603 (S) 5200. 1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSLSC

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Mexico Based Operations (U)

4. (U) Reporting of Cuban activities should commence as outlined in above reference.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

(Sgd) EDWARD S. MEHOSKY  
Lt Colonel, GS

Copy furnished:  
USARMA, Mexico City, Mexico

*for*  
CLAUDE D. BARTON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

004

3

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON MAR 4 1998  
BY CDR USAINSCOM EOP/20  
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.2-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr B/ent/alt/73957

IAS/CI Br/Sec Div

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (25 August 1961) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr informs G2's USARSIX and USARFOUR of various indications of Cuban Intelligence activities in Mexico.

BACKGROUND: CIAS Project 65 and CIAS project 79 concern Sino/Soviet Bloc third-country operations directed against the United States. Inst ltr provides rationale for including CIS as a Sino/Soviet Bloc member for purposes of counter-intelligence.

*Cuban Intelligence Service*

STATUS: Continuing.

RATIONALE: CIAS Projects 65 and 79.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 2 hr

Typist Time: 2 1/2 hr

Action Officer	<i>Edward A. Bittig</i>
Ch. CIAS	<i>Sanford L. Galt</i>
Chief, CI Br	<i>W. J. Kelly</i>
Ch. Sec Div	<i>Charles A. ...</i>

005

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON MAR 4 1998

BY CDR USAINSCOM P022

Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5206.1

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

b1 + b3 CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 6-74



ACSI-SC  
SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

d. [ ]

e. [ ]

f. [ ]

g. [ ]

4. [ ]

5. [ ]

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

151  
JACK L. WEIGAND, Col, GS  
Acting Chief, Security Division

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ON MAR 4 1998  
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 1.603 DoD 5200.1R

078

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

2

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (16 August 1961) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Sino/Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr informs G2, USARSIX & G2, USARFOUR of impending establishment of

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

STATUS: Continuing.

RATIONALE: CIAS Projects 79 and 65.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None.

Action Officer Time: 1 hr

Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, CIAS	<i>[Signature]</i>
Chief, CI Br	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, Sec Div	<i>[Signature]</i>

079



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

3. (U) Records of ACSI do not contain any further information on these activities or personalities which is not already in your possession.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED

CLAUDE D. BARTON

Colonel, GS

Chief, Security Division

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CDR USN/COM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

081

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Feb 61)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

CURRENT: [Inst ltr forwards contents of FBI report to ACofS, G2 Fourth and Sixth US Armies. Report concerns formation of Friends of Cuba Committee in Juarez, Mexico, upon orders of Central Committee of the PCM.]

BACKGROUND: [Report of FBI Office, El Paso, Texas, forwarded to ACSI for info on 26 January 1961.] Report received at CIAS on 31 Jan 61. CIAS responsible for keeping Fourth and Sixth US Armies informed on developments re subject received from other agencies.

STATUS: Continuing, Project 7E.

RATIONALE: To keep ACofS, G2, Fourth and Sixth US Armies, informed of PCM activities which could have a bearing on subject.

DELAY: None.

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 2 hr  
Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer:	<i>B. Wood</i>
Mr. CIAS:	<i>Amyle L. [unclear]</i>
Chief, CI Br:	<i>[unclear]</i>
Ch. [unclear]:	<i>A. B. [unclear]</i>

082

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON *Mar 99*  
BY *ONE [unclear]* FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-003 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr Wood/slc... 3957/CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

DEC 9 1960

ACSI-SC

JUL 28 1965

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
United States Continental Army Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Fourth United States Army  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1211945

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Sixth United States Army  
Presidio of San Francisco, California

1211945

1. (S) The following information pertinent to subject area of activity is forwarded for your information:

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(b)(3)  
CIA

Red from  
MWRB  
14 Dec 60  
JS

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS  
BY AUTHORITY OF  
DATE 8 Dec 62

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SECTION COPY

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~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

b. [

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

]

e. [ ] was born about 1934 in [ ]

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(C)  
FBI

] He resides at Morelos 37, Tamazula. He is a member of the Communist Youth of Mexico, the youth section of the Communist Party of Mexico. In June 1960 [ ] allegedly was selected to take training in the USSR with an ultimate aim of disrupting the activities of the US Project Mercury Station in Guaymas, Sonora, Mexico. In August 1960 [ ] attended the First Latin American Youth Congress in Havana, Cuba. Since his return there has been no further talk of his going to the USSR. [ ] continues to be active in PCM propaganda activities. (FBI Report, Res] 6 August 1960, UNCLASSIFIED).

d. [

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

]

2. (U) Your office will be furnished any additional information received relative to the above activities and personalities.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS

For CLAUDE D. BARTON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

084

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC  
MEMO FOR RECORD: (8 Dec 60) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr fwds info received from other agencies to ACoS, G2 Fourth and Sixth US Armies for information. Distribution of this material has been made to USARMA Mexico by source agencies.

BACKGROUND: Fourth and Sixth US Armies have current specific interest in subject.

STATUS: Continuing (Project 79)

RATIONALE: To keep Fourth and Sixth Armies informed of significant info re subject.

DELAY: Reports are forwarded periodically

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 6 hr  
Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer:	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch. CIAS:	<i>[Signature]</i>
CI Br:	<i>[Signature]</i>
Co, Sec Div:	<i>[Signature]</i>

085

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CD [Signature] FROM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R





Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

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Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 87-91

JUL 28 1965

~~SECRET~~

NOV 10 1960

ACJ-3C

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Fourth United States Army  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

121115<sup>F</sup>

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Sixth United States Army  
Residio of San Francisco, California

121115<sup>F</sup>

1. (S) The following information pertinent to subject area of activity is forwarded for your information. This information was obtained from other national agencies.

a. [

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

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- (5)
- (6)
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RECORD SECTION CO  
Counterintelligence B

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ACSI-5C  
SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (U)

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b. [

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CIA

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]

e. [

ACSI-5C

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (C)

f. [

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(b)(3)  
CIA

] ]  
g. [

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

h. The Juventud Comunista de Mexico (JCM—Communist Youth of Mexico) has its headquarters at Calle Mar Egea 154, Toluca, Mexico City. The FCM, formerly using this address, now is located at Calle Vulcanizacion 203, Colonia 20 de Noviembre, Mexico City. On 5 September 1960, the JCM appointed a Provisional Committee to direct the activities of the organization. This committee will be replaced by a National Committee when a National Congress is held. The members of the committee are: Alberto SALINAS, Armando MARTINEZ Verdugo, Horacio TIRAN, Tonyo CLLAYA, Guillermo ALDANA, Evarado JIMENEZ, Armando ONTIVEROS, Amador JIMENEZ, Zoyto RAMIREZ, and Mauricio CASTILLO. The JCM participated in demonstrations connected with the National Teachers Union strike in June and July 1960 and organized a guard for the National Teachers school. It also provided a guard for the First National Congress for the Liberation of Political Prisoners and the Defense of Constitutional Guarantees which was held in Mexico City in July 1960. The JCM also took part in the student demonstration of 12 July 1960 in front of the US Embassy in Mexico City. An attempt was made during the demonstration to burn a US flag but police intervention prevented this. The action was led by Leonel PADILLA and Antonio TENORIO Adams with Carlos ORTIZ Tejeda attempting to burn the flag. The JCM has been active in propaganda and demonstrations in favor of the principles of the Cuban revolution. In August 1960, names of JCM members who might be interested in taking a course in guerrilla warfare in Cuba being given

094

ACU-5C  
SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (C)

Colonel Alberto BAYO and Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA were collected. Manuel ONTIVERO and Augusto SALINAS are particularly active in organization of these activities. Only lack of funds prevented the JCM from carrying out an intensive anti-American propoganda campaign during the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Mexican Independence. The JCM sent an official ten man delegation to attend the First Latin American Youth Congress In Havana, Cuba, two members of this delegation remained in Cuba to become members of the International Militia. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Letter Report re: Communist Youth of Mexico, Washington D.C., undated, UNCLASSIFIED)

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(b)(3)  
CIA

i. E

REFERRED

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(b)(3)  
CIA

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- (4)
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ACSI-XC  
SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US (C)

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CIA

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ACSI-C  
SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest L (U)

(b)(1)  
FBI

[

]

2. (S)(u) Your office will be furnished any additional information received relative to the above activities and personalities.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

*for J. B. Conroy, Jr. et al b.s.*  
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

097



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr Woc.../gra/CIAS/X73957

ACSI-SC  
MEMO FOR RECORD: (8 November 1960)

(u)  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against the Southwest US. (U)

CURRENT: Inst letter forwards info received from other agencies to ACoFS, G2, Fourth US Army and Sixth US Army for information. Distribution of this material has been made to USARMA, Mexico by source agencies.

BACKGROUND: Fourth and Sixth US Armies' current, specific interest in subject.

STATUS: Continuing, Project 79.

RATIONALE: To keep Fourth and Sixth Armies informed of significant info re subject.

DELAY: Reports are forwarded periodically.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 8 hrs  
Typist Time: 5 hrs

Action Officer	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, Sec Div	<i>[Signature]</i>

098

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CEE.../FOI/PO  
AUTH FARM.../DOL 0200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

972-6204

*J25*  
*P42*  
*2083*

JUL 28 1965

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC  
Exec, OACSI

Information Book Item for ACSI Trip to Mexico (U)  
DSMCI

17 OCT 1960  
Mr Wood/slc/73957

1465) Rusi

(U)

910.1

Eastern Europe

11 Oct 60

(1 page)

1. (U) Reference 5 Oct 60 ACSI/Executive request for up-dating subject Information Book Items; and ACSI-SC DF, above subject, dated 29 July 1960.
2. (U) Forwarded are five revised IBI's on:
  - a. Communist Subversive Activities in Mexico
  - b. The Soviet/Satellite Espionage Threat In Mexico
  - c. Cuban Subversive Efforts in Mexico
  - d. Capabilities and Attitudes of the Mexican Security Agencies
  - e. US Army CI Operations involving Mexico
3. (U) Recommend that none of these items be physically carried outside US territory.

(Sgd) C. F. Leonard, Jr.

5 Incl  
as

C. F. LEONARD, JR.  
Brigadier General, GS  
Director of Security Planning  
and Control Intelligence

*Rid*  
*Ext*  
*7 Nov 60*  
*mxc*

099

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS EXCEPT *if one*  
BY AUTHORITY OF *ACSI-SC*  
DATE *1 Oct 1960*  
APPLIES TO INCLOSURES ONLY

~~SECRET~~  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED when  
separated from classified  
inclosures.

RECORD SECTION C  
Counterintelligence

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (11 October 1960)

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Information Book Items for ACSI Trip to Mexico (U)

CURRENT: Instant action brings up to date IBI's prepared 29 July 1960 on Communist Subversive Activities, Soviet/Satellite Espionage Threat, Cuban Subversive Efforts In Mexico, Capabilities and Attitudes of Mexican Security Agencies, and US Army CI Operations Involving Mexico.

BACKGROUND: Items were originally prepared in July 1960. ACSI to make Mexican trip from 8-15 November 1960. Revision requested by ACSI/Executive, 5 Oct 60.

STATUS: Closed

RATIONALE: Inst IBI's supply ACSI with latest info on Subject activities.

DELAY: None

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: For concurrence by Western Division, WH Section <sup>REC</sup> ~~of Section 1000~~  
12 Oct 60, *concur on CI operations and reporting requirements.*

Action Officer Time: 10 hrs  
Typist Time: 8 hrs

Action Officer Stank J. De W...  
Ch, CIAS [Signature]  
Chief, CI Br [Signature]  
Ch, Sec Div [Signature]

Security Division, CI Br (CIAS)  
Mr. Wood x73957

11 October 1960

028 ✓  
742

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. (U) References: State, CIA and FBI classified reports.
2. (U) Problems: Communist subversive activities in Mexico.
3. (S) <sup>(U)</sup> Discussion:

a. Mexican Communist activities have been centered in the efforts of three legal parties and numerous front groups. The Mexican Communist Party (PCM) is small (estimated at less than 5,000 members) and has been troubled by internal tensions and dissensions. Following labor and student disturbances in the spring and summer of 1959, Mexican security authorities closed down the PCM headquarters in Mexico City and started a roundup of Communist leaders who had gone into hiding. They arrested and imprisoned General Dionisio ENCINA Rodriguez who had been dictator of the PCM for 19 years. Following further student unrest in the summer of 1960, ENCINA's successor, David SERRANO Alfaro, was also arrested on 10 August 1960 and imprisoned. Mexican security authorities have placed PCM leaders under close surveillance and have strengthened measures to prevent printing of PCM propaganda. As a result, the party is demoralized and is experiencing financial difficulties. It is afraid to hold public meetings or collect dues.

b. A splinter party, the Mexican Workers and Farmers Party (POCM) has about 1000 members. Since early 1957, acting under Soviet instructions, the leaders of the PCM have been attempting to achieve unity with the POCM. In May 1960 the PCM accepted a POCM Executive Board proposal to dissolve the POCM and to have individual members seek PCM membership. The decision has had slight effect. Factions within the POCM seek mass union with the PCM and refuse to deactivate as a party. Further opposition to the trend towards unity is manifested by the organizational activities of a number of Marxist lawyers (advisors to labor groups), aimed at formation of a new party, the Party of the Workers Class of Mexico (PCOM). This party is to have its strength among railroad and petroleum industry workers and is to be an "educated Marxist-Leninist" party.

c. A Marxist party, formerly known as the Popular Party (PP) but redesignated on 28 August 1960 as the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), is in effect a Communist political front with the same subversive objectives as the

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BY AUTHORITY OF  
DATE 11 Oct 1960

101

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BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

1101  
CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

PCM and the PDCM, and is equally pro-Soviet. The PSP is headed by the crypto-Communist, Vincente LOMBARDO Toledano, who claims to have received orders in Moscow during March 1959 to assume the dominant role in leftist activities in Mexico. PSP membership is approximately 25,000.

d. Since initiation of the clamp-down in the summer of 1959, Communist Party front activities, have been limited almost exclusively to predictable propaganda: Pro-peace, anti-US Imperialism, and in favor of the Cuban revolution. Agitational activities have concentrated on student-teacher and intellectual circles. One phase of the campaign is targeted against the location of a US satellite tracking station on Mexican soil.

e. The location of a major Soviet diplomatic representation and a number of other Sino/Soviet Bloc missions in Mexico have enabled International Communist leadership to use Mexico as a base for subversive and espionage efforts throughout the Central American and Caribbean area. Increasing Bloc influence in Cuba and a continuation of the Mexican security action against the PCM may cause the transfer of some of these activities to Havana. Soviet preparations for such a transfer may be indicated by the appointment of experienced intelligence personnel to the Embassy in Cuba. Further, there is increased emphasis by the World Federation of Trade Unions on the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC) at the expense of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) headed by LOMBARDO Toledano.

(U)  
4. (S) Conclusions: Soviet instructions, during the spring of 1959, that Mexican Communist leaders eliminate dissensions and promote unity of the Marxist parties of Mexico are clearly a part of the long-range program for Latin America announced at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There will be a strong effort to expand the strength and influence of local Communism in Mexico. This will be attained by taking advantage of the "extreme leftist" character of the LOPEZ Mateos government and the advantageous position of Cuba as a base and cover for operations. While Havana may be expected to become the principal base for International Communist guidance and support in Latin America, Communist advantages and organizations in Mexico will not be abandoned. Despite its leftist orientation, the Mexican government is expected to react to these threats to its security with a program of stricter countermeasures. ]

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

Security Division, CI Br (CIAS)  
Mr Wood x73957

11 October 1960

*Handwritten:* 825 ✓  
842 ✓  
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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

- 1. (U) State, CIA, FBI, USARMA and CIC classified reporting.
- 2. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Problems: Soviet/Satellite espionage threat in Mexico.
- 3. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Discussion:

a. The large Soviet Bloc diplomatic representation in Mexico constitutes a threat to the security of Latin America and the US Army, particularly to the Fourth and Sixth US Army areas. Bloc diplomatic missions are staffed in excess of the legitimate needs presented by Bloc political and economic activities in Mexico. Bloc missions include the USSR Embassy (47 diplomats and employees), the Czechoslovakian Legation (25 diplomats and employees), and the Polish Legation (20 diplomats and employees). Soviet Bloc personnel in Mexico are known to conduct propaganda and espionage activities under diplomatic cover.

b. Soviet Bloc representatives maintain overt contact with Mexican and foreign Communists through various front organizations, such as friendship societies. Clandestine contacts are also maintained with official Communist Party liaison representatives, intelligence agents and members of foreign Communist Parties resident in or transient through Mexico.

c. The following Bloc diplomatic personnel are reportedly involved in espionage operations directed against targets in the United States:

- (1) Colonel Sergio F SOKOLOVSKY, Assistant Military and Naval Attache.
- (2) Colonel Dmitri N KUZNETZOV, Assistant Military and Naval Attache.
- (3) Lt Colonel Yuri CHELPANOV, Second Assistant Military Attache.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS EXCEPT None  
BY AUTHORITY OF [Signature]  
DATE 11 Oct 1960

103

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BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

*Handwritten:* 23

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

- (4) Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN, Military Attache.
- (5) Pavel Federovich KOVALEV, employee in the offices of the Soviet attaches.
- (6) Yevgini Grigarovich LAPSHEV, employee in Soviet Commercial Section.
- (7) Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, Attache and Consul.
- (8) Grigori Nikandrovich YEFREMOV, officially chauffeur for the Office of the Soviet Attaches but actually an intelligence officer.
- (9) Vladimir Vasilyevich NOVIKOV, Second Secretary of the Embassy.
- (10) Gennadij Vasilyevich KUZNETSOV, employee in the office of the Soviet Attaches.
- (11) Tadensz ZIOLOWSKI, Attache in the Polish Legation.
- (12) Ladislav KACHTIK, Czechoslovakian intelligence agent.
- (13) Vaclav KUBATA, Czechoslovakian Consul in Monterrey, Mexico.

d. The following factors favor the conduct of Soviet Bloc operations in Mexico targeted against the US:

- (1) The large concentration of key military installations and industrial facilities in the Southwest US which are readily accessible from the 1500 mile Mexican-US border.
- (2) The existence of approximately 175 facilities in Northern Mexico which can handle aircraft capable of providing alternate routes into the Southwest US.
- (3) The magnitude of traffic across the Mexican-US border (estimated by INS to have been 96 million crossings in 1958, of which 55 million were aliens) which provides a fruitful field for Soviet planting of agents.

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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

(4) The leftist orientation of a great portion of the Mexican population and the consequent residence of Communists and sympathizers on the large ranches in Northern Mexico. These persons provide rendezvous points for Soviet agents. The largest concentration of such personnel is in Baja California.

4. (S) <sup>(u)</sup> Conclusions: The extraordinary number of Soviet/Satellite diplomatic representatives in Mexico and the activities of the three Communist oriented parties of Mexico present a threat to the security of US Army installations in the Southwest US. US Army's aggressive counterintelligence program, in coordination with other US intelligence agencies in the Mexico area, should minimize this threat.

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

4. (S) <sup>(U)</sup> Conclusion: With Soviet support and guidance firmly established in both Havana and Mexico City, Cuban/Mexican-based espionage and subversion operations can be expected to improve in quality. It is believed that Mexican Security Agencies, although handicapped by limited capabilities and the leftist nature of the LOPEZ Mateo regime, will seek more effectively to counter Cuban clandestine activities.

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~~SECRET~~

11 October 1960

*G28  
742*  
SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

1. (U) References: CIA, State, USARMA classified reporting and intelligence reference materials.

2. (U) Problem: Capabilities and Attitudes of Mexican Security Agencies with respect to Communist or other anti-US elements.

3. (S) Discussions:

a. The following six organizations comprise the major elements of the Mexican Security Agencies:

(1) Second Section, Presidential General Staff, providing physical security for the President of Mexico.

(2) Second Section, Army General Staff, providing foreign and domestic intelligence for the Mexican Army and Air Force.

(3) Second Section, Naval General Staff, providing foreign and domestic intelligence for the Mexican Navy.

(4) Second Section, Air Force General Staff, dependent upon the Second Section, Army General Staff, for the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence.

(5) Federal Security Police, responsible for law enforcement. Its functions are similar to the US FBI.

(6) National Police, providing normal police functions.

b. Personnel of the Mexican Security Agencies are known to be susceptible to bribery and graft. They are handicapped by an attitude of indifference towards their responsibilities. Despite these adverse conditions, the agencies perform creditably, particularly in those instances where immediate interests of the President or other high-ranking officials are involved. Corrupt influences are more common and powerful at the lower echelons of the police agencies.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS EXCEPT *None*

BY AUTHORITY OF *[Signature]*

DATE *11 Oct 1960*

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ON *4 MAY 2000*  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

c. The Second Section, Mexican Army, Army General Staff, Secretariat of National Defense, is under the leadership of Colonel Arturo CORONA Medloroz, a graduate of the US Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. During the past year, this agency has shown an ever increasing awareness of the threats posed by International Communist activities generated by Soviet/Satellite personnel in Mexico. Motivated by the expulsion of Bloc representatives for taking part in the railroad strike of March 1959, the Second Section initiated a program to control the travel of Soviet attache personnel in Mexico and to conduct surveillances of their activities. Baja California has been declared off-limits to these personnel. Their travel to any area adjacent to the US border is subject to strict control. The program is severely handicapped by a lack of trained counterintelligence personnel. Intelligence headquarters of the major commands are manned by line officers with no training or experience in intelligence. One Mexican officer graduated from the US Army Intelligence Course, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone (USARCAIB) will be used to organize a counterintelligence section in the Defense Secretariat. The Second Section hopes to take further advantage of this training opportunity. As a stop gap measure, many counterintelligence missions are entrusted to Reserve Officers holding command positions in the normal police security agencies.

d. Although a few Communists and sympathizers have obtained positions in other governmental agencies none is known to hold an important position in the security agencies. Colonel Rangel ESCAMILLA, Director of the Federal Security Police, has indicated that his organization is totally anti-Communist. He has also expressed the hope of continued close cooperation between his organization and the US to combat the common menace of International Communism. Colonel CORONA also expressed himself in a like manner.

e. There is little specific information available regarding the National Police attitude towards the US. Measures taken by that organization in cooperation with the Federal Security Police have effectively paralyzed the activities of the Communist Party of Mexico. This effectiveness may be considered indicative of anti-Communist convictions. The Mexican Navy is the only service which does not openly prefer American to Soviet attache personnel.

SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)

4. (S) (u) Conclusions: Mexican Security Agencies, in particular the Army Second Section and the Federal Security Police, are becoming increasingly aware of the threats posed by International Communism. Within the limits of their capabilities, they are attempting to counter these threats. Lack of sufficiently trained personnel is the greatest weakness of the agencies. They are seeking and receiving US assistance to correct this and other deficiencies. No Mexican Security Agency is known to be significantly penetrated by Communist agents. The only agency not actively exhibiting anti-Soviet tendencies is the Mexican Navy wherein Soviet influence is not believed to be strong.]

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOI-5200-1R

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Security Division, CI Branch  
Lt Col Molmen X56074  
13 October 1960

*228  
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**SUBJECT: Information Book Item for Mexico (U)**

1.  Problem: [ ]

2.  Discussion: [ ]

           a. [ ]

b. [ ]

           c. [ ]

650552 (b) (U)

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inform*

3.  Status:

An interim directive has been implemented which requires the 902d CIC Group to continue these operations through the temporary attachment of those 4th and 6th Army personnel who were engaged in this program prior to the 31 March 1960. [ ]

A request for a personnel augmentation of ten spaces for the 902d CIC Group to conduct these operations has been submitted to O&T Division. Once the problem of funds and personnel has been satisfactorily resolved and formal coordination with ( ) is effected, a final operational plan will be implemented to fulfill the purpose of this program.

4. Recommendation:

That the ARMA, Mexico be made aware of the status of this operation.

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RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

REFERRED

*(see memo)*

~~SECRET~~

(S) ACSI

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ACSI-SC  
Ch, Secty Div

Operation 10324 (U)  
Ch, CI Branch

SET [ ] 56074/30  
Lt Col [ ]

The attached comment #4 is provided for your information and approval prior to its being forwarded to Investigations Branch.

1 Incl  
Cmt #4 w/1 incl

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 May 98  
BY CDR [ ] /PO  
AUTH PARA 1-3.3 DoD 5200.1-R

Rec'd at [ ]  
20 Sept 60  
[ ]

112

RECORD STATION

Declassified when  
information from classified

~~SECRET~~

898-04884 1/22C Singapore

910.1 Eastern Europe

10 Sept 60

CI [ ]

~~SECRET~~

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

777  
pg 3

ACSI-SC (25 August 1960)  
SUBJECT: Operation 10324 (U)

TO: Ch, Investigations  
Branch

FROM: Ch, CIB

DATE: [redacted]  
Lt Col [redacted] 56074/jo

COMMENT # 4

1. (U) [redacted] References: Security Div DF, dtd 8 March 1960, Subject: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U).

2. (U) [redacted] The plan of action outlined in Comment 2, above, has been reviewed and is approved with the following exceptions:

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

b. Costs. The estimated cost figure of \$18,500.00 for the first year of operation appears excessive. A maximum of \$3,000, in addition to Army pay and allowances, appears adequate. It is therefore requested that this item be reviewed and justified.

c. Target date. Since planning for this operation was initiated in March 1960, a March 1961 target date seems unduly long. In addition, since only [redacted] rather than a [redacted] is considered necessary, the target date can be further accelerated. A [redacted] date or earlier appears appropriate.

3. [redacted] Subject to the above exceptions, the plan of action is approved. It is again noted that the individual selected is to be [redacted]

JACK L. WEIGAND, Lt Col, GS  
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

1 Incl  
mc

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CDR USA/INGDOM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-003 DoD 5200.1-R

898-64884

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (E)

~~SECRET~~

5 USC 552 (b) (6)  
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (F)  
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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1993

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ] 56074/jo

MEMO FOR RECORD: (u) [ ] (12 Sep 60)

CURRENT: Investigations Branch informed that the 902nd/plan of action is approved with following exceptions: [ ] requested

[ ] estimated cost of [ ] first year and [ ] subsequent years seems excessive and justification requested; target date of 1 March 1961 changed to [ ]

BACKGROUND: By Security Division DF, dtd 8 Mar 60, Subject: "Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations". Investigations Branch was requested/

June or early July 1960, Major [ ] 902nd CIC Ex, informally coordinated with Lt Col [ ]

In August 1960, a second plan was forwarded to CIB which proposed the hiring of a civilian; this plan was rejected as being unacceptable. On 22 Aug, Investigations Branch agreed to forward a plan using Army personnel.

RATIONALE: [ ]

adequate; [ ] seems excessive to [ ] Cost: [ ] minus [ ] seems

Correspondence initially forwarded to Ch, Scty Div by transmitting DF.

AO Time: 3 hours  
Typing time: 1 hour

Act Off [ ]  
Sec Ch [ ]  
Br Ch [ ]  
Division [ ]

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RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

898-44884

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JUL 28 1965

ACSI-SC

1224788

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ATTENTION: [ ] (b)(7)(C) FBI - 2-25

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
ATTENTION: [ ] (b)(3) CIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ATTENTION: Mr Thomas Davis

1224789

SUBJECT: [ ] (u)

(b)(6)

1. (S) Request this office be furnished any available information which may assist in determining the true identity of [ ] (u)

2. (S) The following biographic data is known to this office:

a. [ ] reportedly a Communist international courier, was born [ ] as Gulstanzian Hakoos. His parents, of Armenian extraction, are: Father—Gulstanzian Hiran; Mother—Arian Hiran Gulstanzian. [ ] is known to have used the following names: [ ]

b. [ ] reportedly fled Turkey in 1924 as a result of the persecution of Armenians and settled in Marseilles, France. In 1938, went to Spain where, under an unknown name, he served in the Spanish Republican Army as either a soldier or as a "Salvation Army nurse". In 1939, he obtained a false passport using the name [ ] and posing as a Spanish national, then traveled to Mexico as a refugee. Arriving in Tijuana, Mexico (date undetermined) he became a flower vendor. On 14 November 1944, [ ] using a false Spanish birth certificate and passport, obtained a visa from the US Consulate in Tijuana and moved to Los Angeles, California. On 1 March 1945, he had his name changed from [ ] to [ ] It has been confirmed that [ ] is the brother of millionaire [ ] (b)(6)

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ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOIRA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

115

ACSI-SC  
DISPATCH SECTION  
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G-2 REGISTRY

NO. 35

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RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence BR

Rec'd from  
Mick Bw  
9 Aug 65

2 p 2 c Surge  
e-476-8 p 859

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Anthony Miran PRINCE (U)

e. PRINCE is described as a Caucasian, male, 5'2", 150 lbs, brown eyes, black hair, and fingerprint classification S 5 9 LT ..  
S 1 UH 2

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 May 2008  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (3 Aug 60)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: [ ] U)

CURRENT: G2, Sixth Army requests information on [ ] reported Communist international courier. Instant correes requests FBI, CIA, and State furnish available information to assist in determining the true identity of [ ]

BACKGROUND: Sixth Army program of study on "Soviet Bloc Mexico-based operations against SWUS". [ ] was first reported as [ ] by Sixth Army; National agencies checks were negative.

STATUS: Pending

RATIONALE: US Sixth Army submitted additional information which may aid the above agencies in identifying [ ] Info from FBI, CIA, and State may aid Sixth Army in their program.

DELAY: None

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None

Action Officer Time: 1 hr

Typist Time: 2 hr

Ch, CIAS [Signature]

Chief, CI Br [Signature]

Ch, Sec Div [Signature]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 MAY 2010  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Anti Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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~~SECRET~~

*927  
p45*

AUG 3 1960  
AUG 5 1960

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: 217 Intelligence Operations (U)

*1224670*

THRU: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
United States Continental Army Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Sixth United States Army  
Presidio of San Francisco, California

*Filed 18 Apr 60*

1. (U) Reference paragraph 2a(2), your letter, above subject, dated 1 April 1960.
2. (U) Information available to OACSI concerning four of the individuals and the organization listed in above reference is forwarded as per your request.
3. (U) ~~██████████~~ Files available to OACSI contain no information concerning the following personalities:

- a. [
- b. [
- c. [

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON *2 Mar 98*  
BY ODIR CERNIGCOM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

4. (U) An information copy of this reply is attached for transmission to ACoS, G2, Fourth US Army.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS

For  
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl  
Bkg List of Pers, dtd 28 Jul 60  
(S/N/R) (U)

118

*C-4734  
p 852*

cc furnished:  
OUSARAW, Mexico

*cc'd to A Co.  
5 Aug 60  
Hob*

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS EXCEPT *non*  
BY AUTHORITY OF *4. [Signature]*  
DATE *28 July 1960*

RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

927  
445

ACSI-SC  
MEMO FOR RECORD: (28 July 1960)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: 217 Intelligence Operations (U)

CURRENT: Instant letter provides G2, Sixth US Army with data available to OACSI on four of the individuals and the one organization listed in paragraph 2a(2) of letter AMGBI-I-2, above subject, dated 1 April 1960. Info copies being forwarded to Fourth US Army and OUSARMA, Mexico.

BACKGROUND: Re AMGBI-I-2, 6th US Army, 1 April 1960, above subject, G2, Sixth US Army provided OACSI with the names and addresses of seven persons and one organization [

] and requested additional data available to OACSI. Matter referred to in para 3, 6th US Army letter, answered by Lt Colonel [ ] P & O Sec, CI Branch.

RATIONALE: To satisfy Sixth US Army request.

DELAY: Necessitated by extensive files/records checks by national level agencies.

STATUS: Complete

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: FBI, [CIA,] Department of State, ONI, CRF, Records Section and Document Library.

Action Officer Time: 7 hr  
Typist Time: 6 hr

Action Officer J. H. Johnson  
Ch, CIAS [Signature]  
Chief, CI Br [Signature]  
Ch, Sec Div [Signature]

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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126*

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5USC552 (b) (1)

ACSI-SE

SUBJECT: Operation SHUTDOWN

18 JUL 1960

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

(U)

1. Forwarded herewith for your information are copies of Interim Operation Directive for 217 Intelligence Operations to be conducted within Fourth and Sixth United States Armies.
2. (U) The 902d CIC Group has been designated the handling and coordinating agency for these operations. Staff supervision will be exercised by this office.
3. (U) Representatives of the 902d CIC Group will contact your office for the purpose of coordinating the requirements of this directive.
4. (U) Detailed plans for continuing this operation after the interim period are being formulated by this office, and it is expected that copies of these plans will be furnished your office on or about 1 October 1960.

(Sgd) Richard Collins  
RICHARD COLLINS  
Brigadier General, GS  
Director of Security, Mapping  
and Combat Intelligence

1 Incl  
Interim Operation Directive (3 cys)

RECEIVED  
JUL 18 14 04 60  
RECEIPT AND  
DISPATCH SECTION  
ACSI

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Regraded CONFIDENTIAL when  
separated from classified  
sources

MR

0-4639 p 826

*and 31 July 60*

1403) ACSI  
910.1  
Evan Egan  
Evan Egan  
18 July 60  
71 p.m. 60

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*J27  
126*

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Operation SHUTDOWN

(u)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [

] 78874/clw

MEMO FOR RECORD (8 July 60)

CURRENT: DCSI CONARC provided copies of Interim Operation Directive for 217 Intelligence Operations and informed that representatives of the 902d CIC Group will contact their office for the purpose of coordinating the requirements of this directive.

BACKGROUND: [

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

RATIONALE: CONARC informed of action being taken to permit continuation of operations against Soviet bloc Mexico-based activities until OACSI plan is implemented.

AO Time: 2 hrs

Typist: 1/2 hr

121

Act Off

Sec Ch

Br Ch

Div Ch

IB Ch

*Malone*  
*Murphy*  
*Coyle*  
*Franklin*

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6USC552 (b) (1)

6USC 552 (b) (6)

ACSI-Se  
Chief, Investigations  
Branch

Operation SHUTDOWN  
Chief, Security Division

JUL 18 1960

Lt Col [ ]/78874/jff

1. (U) Forwarded herewith for your information and necessary action are copies of Interim Operation Directive for 217 Intelligence Operations.
2. (U) This operation is planned for a 90-day period as an interim measure until such time as definite plans can be formulated by your office for operational handling to be assumed by the 902d CIC Group for Security Division, OACSI.
3. (U) It is desired that the CO, 902d CIC Group initiate the necessary action to implement the provisions of this directive and effect the necessary coordination with the DCSI, USCONARC, and the 62s of Fourth and Sixth Armies.
4. [ ] It is further desired that plans for continuation of this operation after the interim period be submitted not later than 1 September 1960. These plans should include but not be limited to such considerations as the number of personnel to be involved, spaces required in excess of present strength, proposed methods of operation, transportation and communication, and the transfer of qualified personnel to be used as [ ] It is intended that this operation be carried under [ ] channels.
5. (u) [ ] It has been tentatively estimated that approximately [ ] will be required for the maintenance of this operation for FY 1961. This amount will be made available to the 902d CIC Group by ACSI.

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unrepe

1 Incl  
Interim Operation Directive (2 cys)

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS

For  
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

122

RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

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separated from classified

MR

1820  
0-4636 p 824

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

*J27  
P26*

ACSI-SC

*(u)*

ACSI-SC/Lt Col

]78874/clw

SUBJECT: Operation SHUTDOWN

MEMO FOR RECORD (8 July 60)

CURRENT: Investigations Branch requested to have 902d CIC implement an interim operational directive designed to prevent loss of those sources of information which were being recruited by Fourth and Sixth Army prior to a CONARC directive prohibiting such recruitment.

BACKGROUND: [

RATIONALE: Attachment of Fourth and Sixth Army CIC personnel to 902d for 90-day interim period will permit an orderly transfer of these operations from Fourth and Sixth Army control to OACSI control and will further be in consonance with DCSI CONARC requirements.

AO Time: 1 hr  
Typist: 1 1/4 hrs

123

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Counterintelligence Br

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Act Off *[Signature]*  
Sec Ch *[Signature]*  
Br Ch *[Signature]*  
Div Ch *[Signature]*  
*IBch [Signature]*

*927*  
*126*

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USC 552 (b) (6)

ACSI

ACSI-SC

Request for Funds (U)

// THRU: DEMCI

Ch, Security Division JUL 18 1960

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ] 178874/clw

TO: DPPA

Attn: Chief, Programs and Budget Division

USC 552 (b) (1)

410.1  
Carlem

1. [redacted]

2. Existing counterintelligence operations being conducted by Fourth and Sixth Armies to combat the efforts of Soviet Bloc Mexico-based intelligence efforts directed against Army installations in those areas are being discontinued for the reason that they do not fall within the mission and area of jurisdiction of USCOMARC. The continuation of this operation has been directed by the ACSI. As an interim measure, six CIC agents from Fourth Army and six from Sixth Army will be assigned on TDY to the 902d CIC Group for 90 days. At the expiration of this period, it is expected that OACSI will have assumed full responsibility for administrative and operational control. The 902d CIC Group has been designated the administrative and operational handling agency for this operation under the staff supervision of the Chief, Security Division.

3. (U) It is requested that these funds be made available to the 902d CIC Group by 15 July 1960.

MEMO FOR RECORD (8 July 60) ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ] 178874/clw  
CURRENT: [ ]  
BACKGROUND: [ ]

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inclosure [redacted]  
c-46  
p 824  
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Counterintelligence Br  
July 23 1960  
Hel

DARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS  
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY  
Colonel, GS

18  
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

RATIONALE: Requested funds are necessary for proper conduct of this operation. Amount requested is best estimate of cost of TDY and Confidential Expenditures involved for FY 61. Security Division does not have funds they can allocate for this purpose.

COORDINATION: Col Bogen, Programs and Budget Division, and Mr. [redacted] Budget and Accounting Branch, were consulted on steps necessary to obtain required funds.

AO TIME: 4 hrs  
TYPIST: 1 hr

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CDT LCAINE/COM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

125

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~~Separated from [unclear]~~

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Counterintelligence Br.

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Act Off *[Signature]*  
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Div Ch *[Signature]*  
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9/27/58 ✓

ACSI-PBB  
SUBJECT: Request for Funds

TO: Ch, Sec Div FROM: Ch, P&B Div DATE: COMMENT NO. 2 (U)  
Maj. [redacted] 76441/ar

Your request for funds as outlined in paragraph 1 of basic DF is noted. It is requested that your justification include detailed information as to how the funds will be used.

PAUL L. BOHEN  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Programs and  
Budget Division

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

Regrade when separated from  
basic letter DF. Y M/R

ACSI-SC  
SUBJECT: Request for Funds (U) (18 July 60)

TO Ch, P&B Div FROM Ch, Sec Div DATE JUL 29 1960 COMMENT NO. 3 (U)  
ACSI-SC/Lt Col [redacted] 78874/clw

Detailed information requested in Comment 2 above is attached as Inclosure 1.

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CD. [redacted] FOVPO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS

For MORRIS E. MONTGOMERY  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

Act Off [redacted]  
Sec Ch [redacted]  
Br Ch [redacted]  
Div Ch [redacted]

1 Incl  
a/s

Pres. Int. Sec'd  
Int. Sec'd

126

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Counterintelligence Br

a-4637 p 824

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18 July 60  
(1 year 60)

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

1313) ADDI  
- 9/10/1 Eastern Europe

SUBJECT: Request for Funds (U)

MEMO FOR RECORD (27 July 60) (S)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ]/78874/clw

CURRENT: P&B Division provided detailed information on fund expenditures.

BACKGROUND: By Sec Div DF to DPPA, Thru DSMCI, dated 18 July 60.  
Subject: [

] By Comment 2, P&B Div requested detailed information as to how the funds will be used.

Detailed information was provided by Investigations Branch predicated upon expected expenditures of the 902d CIC Group. Since the project has not advanced sufficiently to provide an experience factor, the figures provided are best estimates predicated upon costs of similar type operations.

RATIONALE: [

]

(1) (b) 7000506

18 July 60

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Act Off \_\_\_\_\_  
Sec Ch \_\_\_\_\_  
Br Ch \_\_\_\_\_  
Div Ch \_\_\_\_\_

*John DeStella*  
INVB - Hbk

18 Jan 60

~~SECRET~~

Fourth U.S. Army

1960

Serial No. 271

1465) ACS1

HEADQUARTERS  
FOURTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS  
Office of the AC of S, G2

*Mexico*  
*art*

7 MAR 1960

IN REPLY REFER TO:

AKADB-S

SUBJECT: Fourth U. S. Army Mexico/U. S. Border Counterintelligence Program (U)

*Re SOVIET Bloc - Mexico based operations*

TO: Brigadier General Richard Collins  
Director of Plans, Programs and Security  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

1. (U) As requested during your last visit to this office, attached for your information are the operational concepts of our border counter-intelligence program.

2. (U) Since this document reflects operational concepts, it may not be as detailed as you will ultimately want. As I have stated before, we do not have agents operating on this program as yet. We are maintaining our close liaison with other agencies in the border area and have an ear to the ground. However, to adequately cover this area and the problems it presents, it is necessary that additional agents be assigned for this specific purpose (i.e., counterespionage and countersabotage) and that resident offices be established in some border towns.

3. (U) Based upon these operational concepts we will later prepare operational plans for the guidance of personnel actively engaged in this program. In all probability the operational plans will be revised, based upon actual operations once they are commenced.

4. [Redacted]

REFLECT

*Recd from  
CI Br  
14 Sep 60  
RS*

128

~~SECRET~~

*Recd 27*  
*AMMAN B. KOLMEN*  
Lt Col, GS  
Counterintelligence Branch  
Security Division, OACSI

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AKADB-S

SUBJECT: Fourth U. S. Army Mexico/U. S. Border Counterintelligence Program (U)

5. ~~(S)~~ In my letter of 31 August 1959 to General Willems, I requested permission for the G2, Sixth U. S. Army and myself to visit the Army Attache, Mexico City. Purpose of these visits was to make the Attache aware of the concern of this office for the problem of border security and our capabilities concerning it. To-date no authority to make these visits has been received. [

REFERRED

1 Incl  
As stated

*William J. Blythe*  
WILLIAM J. BLYTHE  
Colonel, GS  
AC of S, G2

129

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Fourth U.S. Army  
50  
271

FOURTH US ARMY BORDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

*922  
1/15/71*

I ( )

5USC 552 (b) (1)

*for FBI*

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1. That US Army installations in the Fourth US Army Area are actual or potential targets of espionage, sabotage and subversion by hostile intelligence agencies. (DASRIN 00/SSC-8/DAS-217)
2. That the Commanding General, Fourth US Army, has primary responsibility for the security of these installations. (Defense Atomic Support Agency; installations are excepted)
3. That the 112th CIC Group, under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is the principal operating agency at the disposal of the Commanding General, Fourth U. S. Army, for the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage, sabotage, or subversion directed against the command.

II ( )

CRITICAL AREA

1. The United States-Mexican border in the Fourth US Army Area has been determined to be a critical operational area for the following reasons:
  - a. The existence of a relatively strong Communist Party element in Mexico and the border areas adjacent to the United States.
  - b. The U.S.S.R. and Soviet-bloc diplomatic membership in Mexico greatly exceeds the number deemed necessary in the normal organization of such a diplomatic mission. It must, therefore, be presumed that the excess personnel are engaged in intelligence activities. Since the U. S. offers far more desirable targets than Mexico, it is further presumed that a considerable degree of this intelligence activity is directed against the U. S.
  - c. The close proximity to the border area of sensitive US Army Installations such as Ft Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.
  - d. The U.S.-Mexican border area offers unlimited opportunity for the conduct of hostile intelligence operations directed from Mexico.

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III (u) (S)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. In accordance with the foregoing, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, has directed the following activity by the 112th CIC Group:

a. The assignment of a total of five special agents to key points on the United States-Mexican border in the Fourth US Army Area. These agents will be mature and experienced individuals who possess the necessary language qualification; they will be assigned exclusively to counter-espionage and counter-subversion duties.

b. These agents will:

(1) Establish close liaison with all United States, Federal, state, and local agencies in the border area who exercise control over movements of persons or property across the border. Special emphasis will be placed on liaison with the Border Patrol of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(2) Establish overt sources in the U.S. and Mexico border areas in clubs, associations, commercial enterprises, and similar groups which may have access to information of counterintelligence interest.

(3) [

]

(4) Establish other overt sources having access to counterintelligence information.

c. The following limitations will be imposed on agent activities:

(1) No activities will be conducted in Mexico by agents in an official status.

(2) [

(3) [

]

IV (S)

COLLATERAL OPERATIONAL MEASURES

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, is conducting an intensified research program aimed at the discovery and evaluation of personalities and organizations of counterintelligence interest.

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2. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Sixth US Army, will request through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army [

j. It is anticipated that this team will be composed of special agents of the 112th and 115th CIC Groups.

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, has initiated a program to indoctrinate Installation Intelligence and S2 personnel to insure the strict enforcement of personnel and information security at all installations in the Fourth US Army Area.

(u)  
V

#### COLLATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

1. The Commanding General, Fourth US Army, has requested from the Commanding General, CONARC, an augmentation of five additional spaces in the authorized strength of the 112th CIC Group. This augmentation is essential for the success of the border program. As an interim measure, agents for this program have been requisitioned from USAINTC against vacancies in spaces intended for personnel security investigations.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Fourth US Army, has initiated action to obtain necessary logistic support for this program. Budget estimates for the Fiscal Year 1961 will include estimated costs of this program.

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1439 ACSI

ACSI-9C

Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based and Subversive Operations (U)

Chief, 902d

Chief, Sec Div JUN 28 1960

ACSI-9C/Lt Col

J78874/clw

1. (U) References:

- a. DASRIN OO/SSC-8/DAS-217, dated 9 Nov 59.
- b. COMARC letter dated 31 Mar 60, Subj: Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based operations against Southwest US.
- c. Conference, Presidio of San Francisco, California, 26-27 May 60, between representatives of ACSI, DA, DCSI, USCOMARC, ACoFS G2 Sixth Army in the 115th CIC Gp.
- d. Reports of ACSI representative visit to ARMA Mexico and G2's of the Fourth and Sixth Armies.

2. (U) Since August 1959, OACSI has sought to develop an integrated counterintelligence program which would serve to detect and neutralize Mexico-based Soviet bloc espionage and subversive activities directed against Army installations and activities located within CONUS. This OACSI program requires operational liaison and counterintelligence collection activities in both CONUS and Mexico.

3. (U) By reference 1a, COMARC and other pertinent Army elements were requested to report information concerning this OACSI program. By reference 1b, COMARC informed the G2's of Fourth and Sixth Army that aggressive counterintelligence operations outside the continental borders of the United States are not within the purview of headquarters USCOMARC, the XI Armies and MDW, US Army.

4. (U) Since [redacted] are required for the successful implementation of this program, the Counterintelligence Branch, Security Division is preparing an operational plan which will contain a requirement for elements of the 902d CIC Gp to be stationed in the Southwest United States for the purpose of collecting information on Soviet bloc espionage and subversive activities directed against the United States from bases in Mexico.

5. (U) In order to avoid loss of potential informants developed in pursuance of this program by the 112th and 115th CIC prior to the 31 March COMARC letter, reference 1c, it is requested that your office expeditiously determine the feasibility of attaching to the 902d CIC Gp Fourth and Sixth

910.1 Com. ... Bureau

28 June 60 17 form 5 USC 552 (b) (5)

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ACSI-SC

ACSI-SC/LtCol [ ] 78874/clw

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-Based and Subversive Operations (U)

Army CIC personnel utilized in this operation. A letter is being dispatched to DCSI CONARC requesting comment and/or concurrence to this OACSI proposal. Your office will be informed of the results thereof.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

MEMO FOR RECORD 27 June 60 (u)

CURRENT: 902d CIC Gp requested to determine feasibility of placing certain Fourth and Sixth Army CIC personnel on TDY status with 902d CIC for 90-day interim period.

BACKGROUND: Since Nov 59, Fourth and Sixth Army CIC have been collecting information concerning Soviet bloc in Mexico. By 31 Mar 60 CONARC letter, DCSI CONARC informed Fourth and Sixth Army that they could not pursue aggressive counterintelligence operations outside CONUS. OACSI is therefore preparing a plan to have 902d conduct these operations for CONARC. In the interim, possible sources developed by Fourth and Sixth Army will be lost if continued contact is not made. It is therefore proposed to attach to 902d not more than six agents each from Fourth and Sixth Army for a 90-day period pending implementation of OACSI plan. This is subject to concurrence of CONARC and Fourth and Sixth Army. Sixth Army has already informally recommended interim plan; DCSI CONARC representatives Colonel Pate and Major [ ] at previous conferences noted it would probably be necessary to transfer those Fourth and Sixth Army CIC personnel handling this operation to 902d.

RATIONALE: Recommend action will ~~permit~~ <sup>aid determination for the Gp</sup> continuation of operations until OACSI plan is implemented.

AO Time: 5 hrs  
Typist: 2 1/2 hrs

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 May 2001  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Counterintelligence Br

Act Off [Signature]  
Sec Ch [Signature]  
Br Ch [Signature]  
Div Ch [Signature]

C-4562 p 804

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

b1

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 133+134

**JOINT MESSAGE FORM**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

**UNCLASSIFIED**

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

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PRECEDENCE <b>PRIORITY</b>	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	<b>DA</b>	<b>DA IN 5663</b>	<del>SECRET</del>
INFO			<b>X</b>			

FROM: **ACSI DA WASHDC**

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: **USARMA MEXICO CITY MEXICO**

**UNCLAS DA483984** From ACSI for ARMA. Reference your C-34-60.

Concur. Will inform you later of Lt Col [ ] arrival time.

DO NOT REPRODUCE

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

68

HANDLE AS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNTIL MEMO FOR RECORD IS REMOVED

1960 MAY 5

135  
MEMO FOR RECORD ATTACHED

DATE <b>5</b>	TIME <b>0945 Q</b>
MONTH <b>May</b>	YEAR <b>1960</b>

SYMBOL  
**ACSI-SC**

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)  
**Lt Col [ ]**

PHONE **56074** NR. **1** NR. OF PAGES **1**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
**UNCLASSIFIED** **483984**

SIGNATURE  
*Richard S. Smith*

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE  
**RICHARD S. SMITH**  
Colonel, GS  
Actg Chief, Security Division

RELEASER

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1410 ACSI 710.1 column

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136

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [

] 6074/vb

SUBJECT: Cable to USARMA, Mexico re Trip

MEMO FOR RECORD (4 May 60) ~~(S)~~

Current: [

Background: [

Rationale: Reply will permit [ ] <sup>(b)(1) CIA</sup> to implement his suggestion.

*Coordination, Western Branch Collection Div*

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

REFERRED

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Act Off	<i>Amorino</i>
Spec Ch	<i>Flowers</i>
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Counterintelligence Br

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page (s) 138-139



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FROM:

ACSI DA WASH DC

Meeting to be under your cognizance. Desirable that meeting be held before Col CORONA's forthcoming reassignment. Request you advise [redacted] and Legal Attache that this meeting will occur.

(b)(1)  
CIA

MEMO FOR RECORD (29 Apr 60) [redacted]

Current: [redacted]

DO NOT REPRODUCE

Background: On 20 April 1960, during visit to Washington of Col CORONA, G-2, Mexican Secretariat, General Willems suggested and Col CORONA agreed to a visit by an ACSI representative to Mexico City. Purpose of visit is to provide details concerning Soviet Bloc espionage operations directed against the U. S. Army and means used by the U. S. Army to check and neutralize such operations. [redacted]

(b)(1)  
5 USC 552 (b) (3)  
CIA

Rationale: [redacted]

Coordination: [redacted]

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5 USC 552 (b) (3)  
CIA

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Major Johnson, CIAS/slc/73957

*J2*  
*1330*

ACSI-2

APR 26 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION **100-20667**

ATTN: [ (b)(7)(C) for DB E ]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN: [ (b)(3) CIA ]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ATTN: Mr Milton Crane

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: [ ] and [ ]

(u)

Request this office be furnished any available information on the following:

a. Participation of [ ] (true name undetermined) or [ ] in the Spanish Civil War.

b. Information which may assist in determining the true identity of [ ]

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARRELL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS

FOR STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

DISPATCHED  
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ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINCOM FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Recd from  
MTRB  
27 Apr 60  
JS

IAAC Swaps

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Castro  
Cuba  
1700

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ACSI-SC  
MEMO FOR RECORD: (12 April 1960) ~~SECRET~~

*925  
P30*

SUBJECT: [ ] and [ ] (U)

CURRENT: G2, Sixth Army requests information on [ ] reported Communist international courier and [ ] allegedly [ ] brother. Instant correspondence requests FBI, CIA, and State furnish available information re participation of [ ] and [ ] in the Spanish Civil War and info to assist in determining the true identity of [ ]

BACKGROUND: Sixth Army has instituted a program of study on Soviet Bloc Mexico-based operations against SWUS.

STATUS: Pending--Sixth Army is continuing program of study on the problem of Soviet Bloc espionage in the SWUS.

RATIONALE: Info from FBI, [CIA] and State may aid Sixth Army in their program.

DELAY: None

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: CI Br required that the operational information on the individuals be deleted.

Action Officer *[Signature]*  
Ch, CIAS  
Ch, P&O Sec *[Signature]*  
Chief, CI Br *[Signature]*  
Ch, Sec Div *[Signature]*

*Jo*

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Eastern Espionage  
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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

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*Jan 7  
1957*

IN REPLY REFER TO:

7 April 1960

Brigadier General Richard Collins  
Director of Security, Mapping and Combat Intelligence  
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Collins:

(U) Reference is made to the following correspondence concerning Mexico-based intelligence operations targeted against U. S. military installations in Southwest CONUS.

- a. Your personal letters of 11 July 1959, 14 August 1959, and 14 September 1959. (U)
- b. My message GX 358, 30 July 1960. (U)
- c. Message DA 966244, 2 October 1959. (U)
- d. DASRIN 00/SSC-8/DAS-217, 9 November 1959. (U)
- e. My message 259 AX 28 January 1960. (U)
- f. Letter, ACSI-SIB, "G-B, JM," 4 February 1960 (U).
- g. Message DA 970452, 5 January 1960. (U)
- h. My letter, subject: "Development of Possible Source (U)," 1 April 1960 (S).
- i. My letter, subject: "217 Intelligence Operations (U)," 1 April 1960.
- j. CONARC letter, ATINT-SEC 000.7, 31 March 1960.
- k. CONARC message ATINT 30493, 5 April 1960.

Correspondence referenced in subparagraphs e, h, and i, above, were transmitted through IMMUNE channels. (U)

In compliance with instructions from DCSI, USCONARC, references j and k, above, we have entered into a plan of disengagement from aggressive counterintelligence operations devised to detect and neutralize Soviet-bloc espionage and subversive efforts directed from bases in Mexico and targeted against United States military installations and

Page 1 of 3 pages  
Copy 1 of 4 copies

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CJ Br  
14 Sep 60  
YS*

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ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CDR USAINCOM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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Brigadier General Richard Collins

7 April 1960

(b)(1)

[

]

(S) Aside from my personal feelings about taking such action at a time when it is felt that security is becoming effectively preventive rather than passively defensive, as was the case for so many years, there are a number of problem areas which I would like to bring to your attention.

(b)(1)

a. Personnel and Funds. At the present time we have not been faced with any problems. We have made do with what we had on hand and it appeared to be developing with some measure of success. It is felt, however, that if, as Colonel Heckemeyer recommends, we are called on to render administrative support for 902nd CIC operations in [ ] additional personnel and funds will be required. This, for the most part, because I will have no way of controlling the scope or locale of such operations and will be required to maintain reserve forces of a sort to handle any situation which may arise.

b. Liaison and Sources. A great deal of information now being reported is being developed through liaison contacts rather than controlled sources. In activating this operation, considerable coordination was effected with federal and civil agencies in this army area. As a result, the cooperation now being afforded us is at an all time high. We currently have regular effective contact, at the operational level, with CIA, FBI, INS, Border Patrol, and civil police units along the entire Mexican-Sixth US Army border. No insurmountable problems have arisen and we are now receiving operational information, at no expense, which is considered of great security value. At the present time, the 115th CIC has a total of 15 potential or actual informants on this operation who have already been contacted and are in touch or are under control. Of these 15, only 5 are resident in or must be contacted in Mexico. Such contact has now been ordered terminated. Considerable effort and time has gone into developing these sources, the value of which has yet to be gained. If this operation is to continue, as I strongly feel it should, and operational control is passed to the 902nd CIC Detachment, some arrangement should be made to pass these sources to the 902nd. A list of these sources is attached hereto.]

c. Current Investigations. [


(b)(1)

d. [ ] 145

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Page 2 of 3 copies  
Copy 1 of 4 copies



Brigadier General Richard Collins

7 April 1960

(U) As I indicated to you in our private conversations, this project would have required time and patience to produce results. It is apparent from current reactions that we in Sixth Army, and I specifically, may have gone beyond our depth. It goes without saying that I am rapidly paddling out of the water I have "muddied up" to the safety of dry land.

(U) I was delighted to learn of your nomination for a second star. All of us in Sixth Army G2 offer our congratulations and rejoice in the recognition of an intelligence officer on a promotion list.


Faithfully yours,

*W. R. Rainford*  
W. R. RAINFORD  
Colonel, GS  
AC of S, G2

1 Incl  
List of Sources (u) (dupe)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 24 Mar 98  
BY CD [unclear] FROM FOI/PO  
AUTH PART 1005 DoD 5200.1-R

146



Form with handwritten numbers: Page 3 of 3, Copy 1 of 4

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5USC552 (b) (1)

5USC552 (b)(7)(D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 147-148

2776  
116

# DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

~~SECRET~~

S - 15 May 60

FILE NO. <b>ACSI-SC</b>	SUBJECT <b>Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)</b>
----------------------------	--

TO <b>Chief, Investigations Br</b>	FROM <b>Chief, Security Division</b>	DATE <b>MAR 31 1960</b>	COMMENT NO. 1
---------------------------------------	---	----------------------------	---------------

Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh

1. <sup>(u)</sup> (S) It is requested that your office assist Fourth and Sixth Armies in identifying technical monitoring devices used by the Soviet bloc from bases in Mexico for surveillance of Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army installations. To fulfill this requirement, request that your office:

a. Contact Lt Col [ ] Research & Development Branch, CI/D Division, to determine the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations occurring in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona area.

b. Predicated upon discussions with Col [ ], determine which presently known Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices might be used in Mexico and/or the type of equipment which the Soviet bloc might use for this purpose.

c. Predicated upon the results of a and b, above, provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army counterintelligence personnel. The handy pocket guide will include pictures, descriptions of radar dishes, antennae, and other descriptive data which might assist in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring equipment.

2. <sup>(u)</sup> (S) During November 59, this office informed Collection Division that it was within the capabilities of the Soviet Intelligence Service to employ technical surveillance devices of radar or seismograph type, mounted in northern Mexico and directed against U. S. missile, nuclear and aircraft activities. In Feb 60, Collection Division replied that plans were being formulated and measures would be taken by the appropriate national technical agency to determine if such devices were being used by the Soviets against the U.S. Military (Incl 1).

5 USC 552a (b) (6)

910.1 Corlema Bureau 91770000 60 - 2.1 form 100

1 Incl  
DF dtd 20 Nov 59  
subj: Mexico-based  
Sov bloc Espi & Subv  
activities directed  
against CONUS Armies(U)  
w/1 Incl & Cmt 2 dtd  
11 Feb 60 (S)

*5012 Eastern Avenue  
(9 July 59)*

*Stanley E. Whitmore*

STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

149

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON *26 Oct 98*  
BY ODR USAN/DCM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-3.2 DCD 5200.1R

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*J. J. [unclear]*

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SIB (31 Mar 60)

SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)  
TO Chief, Security Division FROM Chief, Investigations DATE 19 MAY 1960 COMMENT NO 2 (C)  
Branch

1. (U) Information requested in paragraph 1a, comment number 1, is not available from Lt Col [ ] R & D Branch, CI/D Division, ACSI. Other offices contacted with negative results were the Communications-Electronics Division, Office of the Chief, Research and Development; Combat Development Branch, Research and Development Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, and the Communications-Electronics Section, SMI Branch, ACSI.

2. (U) (C) Discussions with personnel responsible for Communications-Electronics Security in ASA have indicated that this information can be ascertained by the ASA Operations Center at Fort Huachuca, if the Chief, ASA Attn: AC of S, Development, is formally requested to initiate a project for this purpose. However, attention is invited to the fact that mere compilation of this data is of questionable value unless Electronics Security and Communications Security Surveys are conducted by ASA. Also, the nature of activities at Fort Huachuca is such that the number and type of electronic emitters being tested is constantly changing. Individually, some of these emitters may be unclassified and of no concern. [If, however, these emitters are intercepted and evaluated as a part of overall activities they then become a matter of concern to ASA.]

3. (U) (C)

4. (U) (C) Much of the information requested in paragraph 1b, Comment # 1 is believed to be available from the Collection Signal Analysis Agency, National Security Agency, if that Agency is provided with general data as to frequency and magnitude of signals being emitted from Fort Huachuca.

5. (U) (C) In summary, the information requested in part 1 a, Comment # 1 can be ascertained only by ASA as indicated in par 2 above. [This data must then be provided NSA in a request for that EEI desired by par 1b, comment no. 1, par 6.] It is recommended that this information be requested by the Communications-Electronic Security Section, SMI Branch, which is responsible for formulation of policy guidance and staff supervision for operational aspects of Communications-Electronics Security.

(b)(6)  
5 USC 552a (b) (1)

150

1 Incl  
n/c

*Lee M. Martin*  
LEE M. MARTIN  
Lt Colonel, GS  
Chief, Investigations Branch

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
ON 20 OCT 98  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
AWth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

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ACSI-SC (31 March 60)

SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)

TO: Chief, SMI FROM: Chief, Security Division DATE: JUL 8 1960 COMMENT NO. 3  
ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ] 78874/clw

1. (U) Request your office implement recommendations contained in Paragraph 5, Comment 2, above.

2. <sup>(U)</sup> Security Branch, OSigO, has been requested to provide information describing, in non-technical language, technical monitoring equipment which might be used by individuals to monitor, in behalf of the Soviets, signals emitted by Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army signal installations.

3. (U) An ONI publication, classified CONFIDENTIAL and concerning a similar subject, distributed to personnel engaged in electronic countermeasures, is attached for your information.

2 Incl  
Added 1 Incl  
2. ONI 26-21A

*Jr* *Stanley E. Whitmore*

STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

910.1 Eastern Europe

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CD [ ] ROOM FOI/PO  
AUTH FAR 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

*Copy in file*

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*Rich  
CIBW  
28 Sep 60  
MLI*

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Regrade CONFIDENTIAL when separated from classified enclosures

*Records Section  
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C 33584 p 478*

C25 ✓  
J 1/16

ACSI

S - 15 May 60

ACSI-SC

**Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)**

Chief, Investigations Br      Chief, Security Division      MAR 31 1960  
Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh

1. (C) It is requested that your office assist Fourth and Sixth Armies in identifying technical monitoring devices used by the Soviet bloc from bases in Mexico for surveillance of Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army installations. To fulfill this requirement, request that your office:

a. Contact Lt Col Fred R. Ulrich, Research & Development Branch, CI/D Division, to determine the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations occurring in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona area.

b. Predicated upon discussions with Col Ulrich, determine which presently known Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices might be used in Mexico and/or the type of equipment which the Soviet bloc might use for this purpose.

c. Predicated upon the results of a and b, above, provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army counterintelligence personnel. The handy pocket guide will include pictures, descriptions of radar dishes, antennae, and other descriptive data which might assist in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring equipment.

2. (S) During November 59, this office informed Collection Division that it was within the capabilities of the Soviet Intelligence Service to employ technical surveillance devices of radar or seismograph type, mounted in northern Mexico and directed against U. S. missile, nuclear and aircraft activities. In Feb 60, Collection Division replied that plans were being formulated and measures would be taken by the appropriate national technical agency to determine if such devices were being used by the Soviets against the U.S. Military (Incl 1).

916.1

East Team Bureau

SI 11 Nov 60 L 1 Nov 60

SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl  
BF dtd 20 Nov 59  
subj: Mexico-based  
Sov bloc Espi & Subv  
activities directed  
against COMUS Armies(U)  
w/1 Incl & Cmt 2 dtd  
11 Feb 60 (S)

152

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 20 Jan 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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1/22 144 Summary

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Counterintelligence Br

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ACSI-SC (31 March 60)  
SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U)

TO: Chief, SMI FROM: Chief, Security Division DATE: JUL 8 1960 COMMENT NO. 3  
ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ]/78874/clw

1. (U) Request your office implement recommendations contained in Paragraph 5, Comment 2, above.

2. Security Branch, OSigO, has been requested to provide information describing, in non-technical language, technical monitoring equipment which might be used by individuals to monitor, in behalf of the Soviets, signals emitted by Fort Huachuca and other Fourth and Sixth Army signal installations. (b)(6)

3. (U) An ONI publication, classified CONFIDENTIAL and concerning a similar subject, distributed to personnel engaged in electronic countermeasures, is attached for your information.

Sgt BARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel GS

For  
STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel GS  
Chief, Security Division

2 Incl  
Added 1 Incl  
2. ONI 26-21A

MEMO FOR RECORD (6 July 60)

ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ]/78874/clw

CURRENT: SMI requested to initiate action necessary to obtain information describing Soviet technical equipment used to monitor signals emitted by signal equipment being tested in US/Mexican border area.

BACKGROUND: By Sec Div DF to Chief, Invest Br, dtd 31 March 60, subject as above, Inv Br was requested to obtain information concerning equipment which might be used to monitor signal corps activities in the Fort Huachuca area. By Comment 2 to this DF, Invest Br outlined plan of action to be accomplished by Communications-Electronic Security Section, SMI Branch, which involves queries to ASA and NSA for necessary information.

RATIONALE: Action to be accomplished by SMI Branch may provide information necessary for publication of a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army CI personnel. At the same time, OSigO, by separate DF, is being asked to provide similar information.

AO Time: 8 hrs  
Typist: 1/2 hr

153

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Counterintelligence Br

0-3584 p 478

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ON 3 Mar 68  
BY CDR [unclear] TO/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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31 Mar 60  
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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

*J25  
JF/16*

SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices(U)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (24 Mar 60)

Current: Investigations Branch requested to provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket guide" which will assist Fourth and Sixth Army personnel in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices used in the Mexican border area.

Background: As a result of General Collins visit to Sixth Army, he desired that ACSI publish a "handy pocket" guide to cover the following requirement: "What would the Soviets have to have in the way of monitoring equipment to engage in technical surveillance of Fort Huachucua operations from south of the border down Mexico way. We should have prepared something in the way of a collection guide for CIC on this subject for both Four and Six Army. Gen Collins suggested that we start with Lt Col Ulrich to develop what are the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations from Huachucua. I believe we would have to go on from there to estimate what equipment the Soviets could use in Mexico for this purpose--then would come pictures, descriptions etc---size of radar dishes, antennae, etc, etc. Having all this poop in handy pocket form, or in his head, the Rainford agent could then browse around south of the border looking for it. Could also ask his friends, the Mexican cops, agents, etc., to look for the kind of thing described. Also cover what portable equipment the rascals might set up in or very near Huachucua for tech surveillance--black boxes with fishpoles, etc.

Rationale: Investigations Branch "exercises staff supervision and renders reports of technical surveillance operations in the Pentagon Reservation and elsewhere, as directed," (Par 7, O&F Manual). This function requires that they know Soviet bloc technical surveillance devices. Investigations Branch is therefore qualified to provide CIAS material necessary to meet this handy-pocket guide requirement.

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ON 20 JUN 00  
BY USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

154

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Sec *Hobby*  
Ch *Whitman*

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

ACSI-SC  
Chief, Investigations Br

Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)  
Chief, Security Div

MAR 8 1960  
Lt Col [redacted] 78874/dh

1465) ACSI  
5USC552 (b) (6) 910

In the accomplishment of this requirement, the following factors will be given primary consideration:

a. Mission.

b. Selection criteria. To increase the probability of a successful operation, it is desired that the individual possess the following qualifications:

(1)

A list of critical military targets for Soviet bloc espionage is attached as Inclosure 1 to this DF.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

in Bureau. Enclosure

8 March 60 (7 pm, 60)

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(E)

e. [

J

d. Coordination. Coordination will be effected by this office with CIA and FBI at the time that operational planning has progressed sufficiently to present a firm proposal to the agencies concerned. Informal coordination has previously been effected on the project with [redacted], CIA liaison officer and [redacted], FBI liaison officer.

(b)(3) CIA

(b)(7)(C) FBI

SIGNED

2 Incl

1. Basic ltr dtd  
3 Nov 59, subj:  
Fe Ts o St Bc Ke(C)  
w/2 Incl (S) m/c & 1st Inc.
2. Cy Sixth Army ltr dtd  
20 Nov 59, subj: Prob.  
Posed by S.bloc Intel G  
Sub act directed fm bases  
in Mex against USA in  
CONUS(U) w/1 Incl(S) m/c

STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

~~SECRET~~

*C-30*  
*7/26*

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (2 Mar 60) (~~SECRET~~)

[

This matter was discussed with General Willems at the last briefing on the subject. He gave general approval to the plan at that time. This D/F will initiate specific operational planning on the part of Investigations Branch.

6USC552 (b) (1)

157

Act Off	_____
Sec O	<i>Propper</i>
Br Ch	<i>Blowes</i>
Div Ch	<i>Willems</i>

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*7/632*

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*J 27 31  
J 11/16*

MAR 1 1960

1 1,665 ACJ

ACSLSC

**SUBJECT: Monthly Report, Soviet Bloc Espionage Directed Against Military Activities in the Southwestern United States (S)(U)**

**TO: United States Army Attache  
The American Embassy  
Mexico City, Mexico**

*411111  
Seto Eastern Espionage*

1. (U) Reference is made to paragraph 7, letter, your office, dated 4 December 1959, subject as above.

2. (S) Forwarded is a Brief covering Soviet Intelligence operational techniques which you are authorized to furnish the G2, Mexican Defense Secretariat.

3. (S) Additional items will be forwarded your office at later dates for transmittal to the Mexican Defense Secretariat. Such items will include, when available, known Soviet Bloc activities in the United States directed against Mexico, and general information on known Soviet Bloc Intelligence techniques considered of value to the Mexicans in their effort against Soviet Bloc espionage.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO  
Lt Colonel, GS

For RICHARD S. SMITH  
Colonel, GS  
Actg Chief, Security Division

1 incl  
Brief, subj: Soviet Intelligence,  
(U), (S) (in dupe)

*Rec'd from  
- mtl. Ev  
+ - mtl. o's  
JS*

158

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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*IF 20 1 of Suspense*

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1 Mar 60

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MEMO FOR RECORD: (23 Feb 60) ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Monthly Report, Soviet Bloc Espionage Directed Against Military Activities in the Southwestern United States (S)

CURRENT: Instant ltr fwd OUSARMA, Mexico a sanitized Brief on Soviet Intell operational techniques and authorizes USARMA, Mexico to transmit it to the G2, Mexican Defense Secretariat.

BACKGROUND: Action indicated above is predicated on instructions contained in CI Branch Project C-6-60 assigned CIAS for implementation.

STATUS: CI Br Proj C-6-60 is a continuing requirement.

RATIONALE: Furnishing of intell info of interest to Mexican Defense Secretariat through OUSARMA, Mexico will establish and increase the effectiveness of operational liaison between OUSARMA, Mexico and Mexican Intell agencies.

DELAY: Suspense date of 19 Jan was extended to ASAP pending approval of release material by CIA per fonecon Lt Col Molmen/Maj Matulis on 28 Jan 60.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
CIA

COORDINATION: Contents of attached Brief (of CIA origin) coordinated with CIA, [redacted] CIAS/Maj Matulis, CIAS).

Coordination with Lt Col [redacted] CI Br, Sec Div by Maj Matulis (26 Jan 60) established that attached Brier need not be coordinated with SMI since the contents stemmed from an agency outside the US Army.

(b)(6)

Coordination

SMI Br. Concurs [Signature]

159

[Signatures and stamps: Kelly, Jan, Matulis, [redacted], [redacted], [redacted]]

53  
202

23 ✓  
9770

ODGNCI/OACSI  
Lt Col [ ] x78674

5 February 1960

**SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Espionage Operations (U)**

1. **PROBLEM.**

To detect and neutralize Soviet bloc Mexico-based espionage operations directed against the Fourth and Sixth U. S. Armies.

2. **DISCUSSION.**

[Redacted]

3. **(U) COMMENT.**

160

This is a sensitive, difficult operation and, of necessity, will require a considerable period of time to achieve tangible results.

4. **(U) RECOMMENDATION.**

That the above information be noted.

5 - [Redacted] Customs & [Redacted] (U) (9) 295 OSNS  
5 - [Redacted] 6 REFERRED  
[Redacted] 5 [Redacted]

172  
3952  
Suzanne

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NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 161-164

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (26 Jan 60) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage

CURRENT: The Sixth United States Army has completed the initial stage of their study on industries in their area which are most critical and vulnerable and would satisfy known Soviet Bloc EEI. Instant correspondence forwards to [FBI] and [ ] the Sixth Army's listing which was extracted from inclosure to Sixth US Army Letter, subject: 217, Intelligence Organizations (U), 6 Jan 1960. Information contained in letter not forwarded to [FBI] and [ ] since these agencies are aware of information contained therein.

REFERRED

BACKGROUND: Listing of the Military and Industrial Installations in the Fourth area and the Military Installations in the Sixth Army area were forwarded by letter on 28 January 1960. Installations listed were those considered most vulnerable and likely to satisfy Soviet Bloc EEI.

STATUS: Pending. Sixth Army is continuing its study of this situation.

RATIONALE: Lateral exchange of information in furtherance of this program.

DELAY: None

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None required

165

Action Officer Donald A. Hester, Lt. Col.  
Ch, CIAS R. G. [unclear]  
Ch, P&O Sec [unclear]  
Cust, CI Br [unclear]  
[unclear] Coatelle

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Captain Horner/hmk/73957/CIAS, CI Br/Sec D

14657 ACISI

JAN 28 1960

1217709

ACSI-SC

*23 p45*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ATTENTION: [ ] (b)(7)(C) FBI

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, CENTRAL INTELLI-  
GENCY AGENCY  
ATTENTION: [ ] (b)(3) CIA

DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION  
SERVICE

1217710

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (u)

1. Furnished herewith for information are lists prepared by the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2, Fourth and Sixth United States Armies, of those installations in respective areas, considered to be most vulnerable and most likely targets of Soviet Bloc espionage. Lists of installations are arranged in their relative order of priority based on the following factors:

- a. Size and importance.
- b. Vulnerability and accessibility to espionage forces operating across the border between the United States and Mexico.
- c. Criticality of mission with respect to the satisfaction of known Soviet Bloc intelligence requirements.

2. Installations in Fourth Army Area:

a. Military:

(1) Fort Bliss, Texas

*RG*  
*Heb*

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ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

*Recd from  
M. H. B.  
29 Jan 60  
JS*

*4 p 2 c 1 cy espionage*

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2566*

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*9/12/11*  
*9/12/11*  
*9/12/11*

Counterintelligence Br

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (u)

- (2) White Sands Missile Range, Las Cruces, New Mexico
- (3) Pontex Ordnance Plant, Amarillo, Texas
- (4) Menzano Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
- (5) Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
- (6) Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas
- (7) Fort Sam Houston, Texas
- (8) Medina Base, San Antonio, Texas
- (9) Fort Sill, Oklahoma
- (10) Bossier Base, Shreveport, Louisiana
- (11) Red River Arsenal, Texarkana, Texas
- (12) Killeen Base, Killeen, Texas

b. Industrial:

- (1) Douglas Aircraft Company, Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
- (2) Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Fort Bliss, Texas
- (3) Gilfillan Brothers, Inc., Fort Bliss, Texas
- (4) Hughes Aircraft Company, Inc., Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
- (5) Western Electric Company, Inc., Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico

167

2

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ON 2 Mar 98  
BY CDR USN/COM FIC  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.

~~SECRET~~





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC  
MEMO FOR RECORD: (20 Jan 60) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Probable Targets of Soviet Bloc Espionage (C) (u)

CURRENT: Fourth and Sixth US Armies have made studies of the most critical and vulnerable targets in their respective areas which would satisfy known Soviet Bloc EEI. Instant correspondence forwards to FBI, [CIA] and INS the listings from Fourth and Sixth Armies.

BACKGROUND: Fourth and Sixth Armies have reported previously that Soviet Bloc intelligence services were possibly mounting operations against SWUS from bases in Mexico, since the crossing of the Mexican-US border was not too much of a problem.

STATUS: Pending. Fourth and Sixth Armies are continuing their studies of this situation. FBI, INS, and [CIA] may be of assistance in the continuance of this program.

RATIONALE: With assistance from the FBI, [CIA] and INS, Fourth and Sixth Armies may better neutralize any suspected or known Soviet Bloc intelligence operation in this area.

DELAY: None.

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Donald Albrow, Capt  
 Chief, CIAS [Signature]  
 Chief, CI Branch [Signature]  
 Chief, Security Div [Signature]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4 MAY 2000  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC  
501.4  
CONFIDENTIAL  
[Handwritten notes]

~~SECRET~~

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

ACSI-SC/Maj [ ] 78874/dh

(ACSI) ACSI

ACSI-SC

JAN 8 1960

**SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against Southwest United States (U)**

**TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
U. S. Continental Army Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia**

1217077 - 4

1217079

2  
9/10/1  
L  
REFERRED

1. ~~SECRET~~ Forwarded for your information and appropriate action is letter, dated 4 December 1959, Subject: "Monthly Report, Soviet Bloc Espionage Directed Against Military Activities in the Southwestern U. S. ~~SECRET~~"

2. ~~SECRET~~ Paragraph 6, referenced letter, provides names of Mexican military personalities and unit locations with whom liaison is encouraged. Authority for visits and discussions with the Mexican Armed Forces is contained in ~~SECRET~~ par 4c, AR 390-25.

4. (U) Information contained in referenced letter is extremely sensitive and will not be disseminated outside Army and will be disseminated within Army on a "need-to-know" basis.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl  
a/s (S)

171  
1217078

Copies furnished:  
Fourth and Sixth  
Armies

SEE ATTACHED MEMO FOR RECORD

RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

~~SECRET~~

0-3809  
0020

R. cd  
C. I. B.  
H. [unclear]

*Jan 7/2*

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Mexico-based Operations Against Southwest United States (U)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Jan 60) (SECRET)

CURRENT: DCSI, CONARC provided [ ] December report concerning Soviet-bloc Mexico-based espionage operations directed against Southwest United States. Fourth and Sixth Armies provided information reports.

BACKGROUND [ ]

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

RATTONALE

DELAY: Delay due to administrative processing of report from S-letter to reproduction for transmission to CONARC.

*Coordinated with SMI, FLC, and Western Branch, Col DIV. 5*

172

Act Off *[Signature]*  
Sec Ch *[Signature]*  
Br Ch *[Signature]*  
Div Ch *[Signature]*

RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

~~SECRET~~

*e-3809  
7540*

REFERRED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

*2:30 p/11*

1960 JAN 7 20 37Z

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION <b>ROUTINE</b>	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO			<b>I</b>	<b>DA</b>		

FROM: **ACSI DA WASH**

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO:

**SECRET** 91011  
**970570** From ACSI for G2.

1. ~~SECRET~~

2. ~~SECRET~~

DO NOT REPRODUCE

REFERRED

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

91011

**A - PARAPHRASE NOT**

SEE ATTACHED MEMO FOR RECORD EXCEPT PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION - PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL ORIGINAL REFERENCES BY DATE TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION

*Rec'd from Coll. Section 8 Jan 60 75*

RECORD SECTION COPY Counterintelligence Br

173

DATE	TIME
9	1515
MONTH	YEAR
Jan	60

SYMBOL	ACSI-SC		
WRITER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		
PHONE	78874	PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	970570		

SIGNATURE	<i>Stanley E. Whitmore</i>
RELEASE	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
SEER	STANLEY E. WHITMORE Colonel, GS Chief, Security Division

*91011*  
*Custom Language 1 Jan 60*

~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SO

78874/dh

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Jan 60) (~~SECRET~~)

Current: [ ]

Background: [ ]

REFERRED

Information to be provided by OACSI to ARMA. Mexico will concern Soviet bloc espionage techniques.

approve items passed.

5 USC 552 (b) (1) ACSI will for FBI

Rationale: [ ]

In addition, steps being taken by Fourth and Sixth Armies to improve their liaison with the Mexican military on the SW border should result in more effective Mexican-US military coordination on this problem.

Dept of the Army Policy for Disclosure of Classified Information to Foreign Governments (DA-DCMI), dtd 25 Jan 1956, authorizes Intelligence information to SECRET to be disclosed to Mexican Government.

Paragraph 4c, AR 380-25, Authority of Commanding Generals, 21 armies, authorizes visits of members of the Armed Forces of Canada and Mexico to D/A installations or activities in connection with coordination of security matters pertaining to the border.

Delay: [ ]

This necessitates processing by Collection Division and reproduction for dissemination to CONARC and 4th and 6th Armies.

REFERRED

COORDINATION:

FLO W. Jordan per Lt Col & T. D. Rubin X 1, 135

Western Br, Coll Div John J. E. [unclear] X 52931

SMI And. P. Muller Jr Lt Col X 55892

174

Act Off \_\_\_\_\_

Sac Ch \_\_\_\_\_

Br Ch \_\_\_\_\_

Div Ch \_\_\_\_\_

RECORD SECTION COPY  
Counterintelligence Br

~~SECRET~~

C-3510  
PSAC

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 175-176

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Page(s) 177-181

~~SECRET~~

CIFILE

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY CARIBBEAN  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORT AMADOR, CANAL ZONE

IN REPLY  
REFER TO  
091.411 (GB)

13 October 1950

931.274  
283.4  
0001

SUBJECT: Soviet Agents in Mexico  
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C.  
ATTN: Chief, Intelligence Division, G2

1. Reference letter, G2/IWW/ 000.244 Mexico, 29 September 1950, subject, "Soviet Agents in Mexico."
2. No record exists, in this headquarters, of the formation or existence of "Institute of Military Exchange."
3. References on file in this office containing information concerning the five Soviet military personnel, in whom the Federal Bureau of Investigation has expressed an interest, are as follows:

- [ ] BID 3164.0600, R-191-48,  
16 June 1948, subject, "Movement of Soviet Couriers."
- [ ] BID 3164.0600, R-358-48,  
20 October 1948, subject, "Travel of Soviet Couriers."
- [ ] BID 3164.0600, R-80-49,  
6 APRIL 1949, subject, "Travel of Soviet Couriers."
- [ ] BID 3164.0600, R-90-49,  
3 May 1949, subject, "Soviet Courier Travel."
- [ ] BID 3164.0600, R-57-50,  
10 July 1950, subject, "Travel of Soviet Couriers."

5 USC 552a (b) (2)  
Per 2/17

Department of State, OIR Report No. 4384.13D, 1 March 1950,  
subject, "Members of Military Missions Abroad."

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 45, G2, United States Forces,  
Antilles, 12 November 1948.

Letter, Military Intelligence Division, G2, Department of  
the Army, 3 February 1948, subject, "Soviet Diplomatic  
Courier List."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 7 Jul 98  
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

60 pages

~~SECRET~~

091.411 (GB)  
SUBJECT: Soviet Agents in Mexico

13 October 1950

This information has been received from the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, or from other agencies who have supplied the same information to the Department of the Army. This office does not have any additional information.

4. Any new information received by this headquarters, concerning these individuals will be forwarded to your division.

*R. L. Mabie*  
R. L. MABIE  
Colonel, GSC  
AC of S, G2

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 3 Mar 98  
BY CDR L. G. W. COM FOI/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-5.3.3 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 184-192



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AUSC 552 (b) (1) (A)  
b7D

- 2 -

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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USC 552 (b) (1)

for FBI

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Page(s) 196-198

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Page(s) 199-202

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
WASHINGTON

SD-22814  
TOP SECRET CONTROL  
A. C. OF S. C-2. DA.

(EM) 0-2

BK's  
P10

DECLASSIFIED ON 12 YEAR SCHEDULE;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED,  
DOD DLR 5200.10

24 August 1945

CIFILE

383.4 U.S.A.S.K.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION:

SUBJECT: Communist Agents of Soviet Russia

The following individuals have been identified as Communist agents of Soviet Russia in Mexico, unless specified as being located elsewhere:

1. Peter MANOULISKY, alias KOLOSKY, alias "Comarada Pedro". Said to have entered Mexico in 1928 or 1929. Reported a delegate to International Comintern.
2. Leon HAIKIS, alias "Sacomi". Reportedly a Spanish refugee who formerly served as a Secretary in Soviet Legation in Mexico. Also was a personal advisor of Moe. KOLONTAI. Reported a delegate to International Comintern. As Commissariat of G. P. U., he is presently said to be secretary of the group which is forming the Executive Communist of the Comintern, recently re-activated.
3. Peter STRECHER. Reportedly delegate from Great Britain to the International Comintern.
4. BIDEKMAN or BIETTELMAN (no first name available). German Jew. Reported a Communist delegate to International Comintern.
5. CHANDLER (first name unavailable). American. Said to have been in jail in United States. Allegedly member of Communist Party of United States. Arrested on crossing border in August 1940. Asterisk. Reported a delegate to International Comintern.
6. URIEE (his first name is believed to be Vicente). Said to be member of Spanish Communist Party and delegate to International Comintern.
7. Juan COMORERA soler. Alleged member of Communist Party of Republic of Catalina and reported to be a delegate to International Comintern.
8. James FORD. American negro. Said to be Member of Communist Party of United States. Asterisk. Reported delegate to International Comintern.

203

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 3 Mar 99  
BY CDR/USN/USC/JFO/PO  
AUTH PARA 1-600 DOD 5200.1-R



Record  
from survey  
2 Nov 51  
175

Regraded: SECRET By Authority  
of ACSI Memo 6-58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. [ ] Reportedly has very bad reputation in Mexico City. Reported delegate to International Comintern.

10. [ ] Alleged member of Communist Party of Mexico. Reported delegate to International Comintern. (b)(7)(C)

11. [ ] He is said to have been former head of Spanish Communist Party - political police.

12. [ ] (no first name given). Has criminal reputation in Mexico and is said to be one of Lombardo Toledano's gunmen.

13. [ ] Mexico's Ambassador to Soviet Union, recently appointed. Said to have been named at personal request of Russian Ambassador.

REGRADING INFORMATION  
ON 3 MAR 98  
BY CDR. [REDACTED] CIVPO  
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~